The Ontological Argument: Can God’s Existence Be Proven by Thought Alone?

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So tragic story came in one day
and my wife, well, actually I

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think I was out and she's like,
hey, the the toilet's leaking.

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I was like, oh, we'll turn the
water off, I'll check it out.

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And it was a connection to the
bidet.

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Oh, that is tragic.
So I had to trash that one.

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So it was like two or three
weeks and then I finally was

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like I I need to buy a different
bidet.

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So I have it just got delivered.
I just haven't had a chance to

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install it so.
What a good day that'll be.

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Get the bidet back up and
running honestly.

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Have you?
Have you gone through more than

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one bidet?
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

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Not not a lot, I think just two,
maybe 3, I don't know.

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Yeah, I'm probably buying them
on the cheaper end of things,

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so.
Yeah, You wanna go ICE if you

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you need to like lease like a
$400.00 a month bidet.

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Those are like the, it's like a
car, like a nice car.

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You're just like, that's when
you know, you got a good one.

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I'm just kidding.
That you, you can get a $400.00

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bidet if that's, if that's your
thing.

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Yeah, like you can get a toilet
that's like it's all built in.

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It's like warming and stuff.
That's the first bidet I ever

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tried was like its own thing in
a foreign country.

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And I was like, I don't know,
like 12 years old or something.

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And me and my little brother, my
little brother was 8.

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And we were like, just like, we
were like, what is this thing?

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Like, we didn't know?
And it would like squirt water

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like across the room.
And is this a water fountain?

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We were like losing our mind,
'cause it was like the toilet's

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here and then there's this whole
other toilet that's not a toilet

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and it just blew, blew our
minds.

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And we were like obviously
immature and young boys and just

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like my mom was like we, we had,
we were like told like you're

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not allowed to miss the room
anymore 'cause it's going too

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crazy.
So.

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It was, you know, it was fun.
Yeah.

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Got to get that.
Got to get that home.

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But hey, we I know we should get
sponsored.

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By we should get sponsored by
somebody 'cause I I bet we're

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the only Christian podcast that
was talked about bidets twice

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now.
At least that's.

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Great.
When we've learned we were

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growing in our podcasting.
I won't figure out the

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specifics, but our transition to
a very serious topic.

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Yeah, we didn't really match up
our banter with the topic the

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the last time, so yeah.
So we're learning, we're

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learning, we're learning.
You know, it's great.

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You know, bidets, man, I don't
know when, when did, but when,

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when did bidets start to be a
thing?

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I know in American culture not a
huge thing like I know other.

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Places.
Not a huge thing, but I think

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they're growing.
If I had to guess, I'd say maybe

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3 to 5% of homes have them.
That may be high.

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I don't know man.
Normalize bidets.

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I watched this guy.
He's called poor, poor man's

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pumper, poor pumper society.
But but basically he's from

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Texas and he pumps septic tanks.
Oh, OK, yeah.

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And he's like, if you want me to
see less of me coming out to

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pump your septic tank, get a
bidet.

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You're going to use less toilet
paper.

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The fewer solids that go in your
septic tank, the slower it

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accumulates 'cause you just have
the the wastewater going out

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into your drain field.
And he's like I use a bidet.

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Dude, you'd be stupid not to,
you know it's.

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Just like stupid not to.
You heard it.

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From Zach.
You don't have the day.

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Put that on the T-shirt.
Be stupid not to.

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Our next T-shirt, you know, it's
great.

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You know, it just, I, I said
this last time, it's like you

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go, you just, you garden.
You're not going to just wipe,

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get paper towels and wipe your
hands off.

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You're going to wash those
hands.

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I'm going to wash.
It you know so.

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Wash.
Clean.

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Wash clean.
Yeah, we should.

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Transition something you know
about something better than the

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ontological argument.
Yeah, ontological.

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When I think of ontological
argument, I don't know what

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come.
I don't know what comes to most

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people's minds.
Probably nothing.

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Probably like what is that word?
Why are, you know, there's

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probably people who will not
listen to this because of the

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title?
We need to, we need to sneak it

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in.
A Trojan Horse title.

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Yeah, yeah.
So win the free car title or

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something?
Like that, it'll be like, what's

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something like everybody wants
to hear more of and then we just

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like hit them with the.
Greg Kochel biography right?

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More Greg Kochel quotes.
You might be overlapping too

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much with the ontological
argument crowd.

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We might be.
More Tom Brady stuff.

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Snap.
I'm gonna tell you something.

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I didn't get to see it Sunday
'cause we were preparing for

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Home group, which you weren't
at, but I was kind of keeping

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tracks.
And apparently Drake May had an

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awesome pretty.
Honestly, they played this.

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He doesn't have a son, so he
hasn't kissed a son in the mouth

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yet, so.
That's that's in his faces on my

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birthday.
Great birthday present.

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Steelers beat the Patriots.
Do you?

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Did you watch this game?
I don't this year.

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This year, just 21st September
20.

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First ohh, just ohh Yeah yeah
yeah, we got.

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A We got a huge fan over here.
Yeah, yeah.

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No, no, no.
I'm scanning, 'cause it was

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Raiders and then we won and then
we lost and it was, you know.

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Why you lost to the Steelers?
No.

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'Cause you guys turned the ball
over 5.

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Times.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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That was against the Steelers.
You guys fumble it and we beat

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the.
Dolphins.

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We lost.
The Raiders beat the Dolphins,

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and it was.
You should have beat us because

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we got the ball.
Oh, 'cause this is where I got

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mad.
I just turned it off because we

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were like on the goal line and
this guy's running with the ball

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like this and y'all punch it
straight out, dude.

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I didn't I I had mentally
blocked out that it was the

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Steelers.
It's great even we just played

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the Vikings and beat the
Vikings, same thing like they're

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just fumble.
I Steelers defense is not been a

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little point.
It's coming on strong the last

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couple weeks, but it just
turned.

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It's turns out it's hard to win
a full game when you turn the

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ball over 55.
Times 5.

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Turnovers and it was a close
game.

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Like, you know, that's that was
the and Drake may look a

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Steelers have no pass rush, but
it was like Drake may look good.

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I mean, when he has just like
any quarterback, he had some he

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was like making good throws.
It was just like, yeah, he he

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actually looks pretty good from
what I've seen.

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I don't follow them too much,
but it's like he's like not

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making a ton of mistakes.
Like their turnovers too.

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Weren't him just getting
interceptions every a lot of

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fumbles?
It's like 3 or 4 fumbles.

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Do we play all again?
We do don't.

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Don't we, maybe, I don't know,
we're both AFC, so I don't know

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how the but.
You're not AFC North, right?

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AFC North.
No, we're, we're just.

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Dolphins and.
Classic Patriots.

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You guys play nobody.
And bills, right?

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Yeah, yeah, bills are actually
good so that that's good, but

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but for like my whole life did
not be good besides for a couple

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years in the 90s, but.
All right, well, we gotta move

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on to logical argument, so
probably the most esoteric and

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we're going to do our best.
I was telling Zach before we

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started, like he's like my test
person.

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So if I can get Zach to
understand it, I think I can get

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most people to understand it
'cause you'll ask me the

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questions like if if something
doesn't make sense, you'll stop

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me and you'll say that doesn't
make sense.

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I love it.
I will also for our listeners.

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Michael also did say earlier I
only got 9 pages of notes for

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this one so.
It's based out.

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It's based.
Out.

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Yeah, yeah, that's great.
I'm just kidding.

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I'm not kidding, but yeah.
Well, let's take this to the

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next level.
From the hearts of the Low

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Country in South Carolina.
It's the Take Two podcast where

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we take theology to the next
level.

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All right, Zach, so we have done
a series of apologetic

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arguments, cosmological
argument, theological moral

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argument.
They seem to get some engagement

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you.
Know what we should do next?

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The wife's arguments.
The the wives argument is that

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a.
No, but there's it should there

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should be like an apologetic
argument that's like because I

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said so or like, I don't know.
I don't know.

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I didn't say that that was that
the wives argument because I was

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that I'm.
Just kidding.

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I'm trying to think of like
something like fun that was like

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less academic, you know, Like,
you know what people can relate

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to.
We could do like a whole podcast

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on that anyway.
Very.

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Good.
All right, so ontological

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argument actually has a long
history, but I wanna before we

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started the argument proper, I
want you to think of a valley.

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OK.
And try to imagine a valley

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without a mountain.
Yeah.

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And maybe you're like, well, I
can think of a flat land and

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like a trench, but that's not a
valley, It's a trench.

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Or maybe like a Cliff.
But like so that's that's really

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not a valley either.
So if it's a true valley, it

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kind of entails the idea that
there is a mountain.

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You can't have one like it
logically entails.

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It goes.
Together, it's like there ain't

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no Mountain High enough.
Right.

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Ain't no valley low enough.
That's what comes to my mind,

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yeah.
There's some other of these

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things that kind of entail each
other.

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Like you can't really have a
shadow without there being light

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because the shadow.
Like you can just have total

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darkness.
That's not shadow.

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Yeah.
You can't have a hole unless

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there's like some material that
that's been dug in.

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OK.
Yeah.

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If I said there's a child, then
that logically entails that

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there was a parent.
Yeah.

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If I say there's inside, that
logically entails that there is

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an an outside.
Yeah.

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And So what we're saying is when
we think of a greatest possible

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being or a maximally great
being, the idea of that entails

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its existence, It logically
entails it.

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And so some people, this one
some people don't like I'll.

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Yeah.
I will only I.

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Think on its face.
I think when you explain it,

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everyone's gonna love it.
But.

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Yes, yeah, yeah.
But I think you read something

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like that.
You're like, well, what if I

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just think of I, I don't know,
you know, does that mean it has

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to exist?
Right.

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And we we will deal with that
because there's like the

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maximally great Island rebuttal.
I've I've heard.

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No, this is not draw my manning
because I have listened to some

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responses and one person said,
you know, the maximally great

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pizza, you know, yeah, different
things.

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The maximally great pizza then
doesn't exist.

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So we, yeah, let's, we will
address those rebuttals.

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But the idea is that if there
really is, if it's possible that

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there is a maximally great
being, then it really entails

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that being's existence.
And so that is the ontological

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ontology just means existence,
like what's really real.

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And so this is like an existence
argument.

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That's what that word means.
So don't get, don't, don't get

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then.
You think of like the Trinity,

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you think of the ontological
Trinity versus the economic

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Trinity and that that helps you
think, you know, it's not like.

228
00:10:48,600 --> 00:10:50,560
Maybe for some people, OK.
Yeah.

229
00:10:51,080 --> 00:10:52,920
Yeah, Yeah.
So ontologically, like what?

230
00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:58,880
How do they relate to themselves
in their purest existence versus

231
00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:02,160
the economical?
How do they relate to themselves

232
00:11:02,160 --> 00:11:04,560
in the economy of salvation
'cause they had different roles

233
00:11:04,560 --> 00:11:07,560
there?
Yeah, OK, so St.

234
00:11:07,560 --> 00:11:11,280
Anselm was the first one to
really put this out.

235
00:11:11,360 --> 00:11:14,760
Renee de Cart had a version.
It didn't.

236
00:11:14,840 --> 00:11:19,080
It wasn't as famous.
Leibniz took Renee de Carts and

237
00:11:19,400 --> 00:11:21,680
refined it, and that one became
well known.

238
00:11:22,120 --> 00:11:26,040
Kant kind of pushes back against
that.

239
00:11:26,040 --> 00:11:30,000
Spinoza, Heartsburn, Godell and
Malcolm all have their versions.

240
00:11:30,360 --> 00:11:34,440
Plantica is going to take
Godell's version and kind of

241
00:11:34,440 --> 00:11:36,800
give it to what is today.
So out of all that, what you

242
00:11:36,800 --> 00:11:40,160
should remember is there's kind
of the big three, OK and Selm.

243
00:11:40,160 --> 00:11:42,560
He's like the he's like the
first person that gets a lot of

244
00:11:42,560 --> 00:11:46,240
credit, foundational.
And selm live Nets and then

245
00:11:46,240 --> 00:11:48,320
plantinga.
Plantinga, I don't hear.

246
00:11:48,320 --> 00:11:53,280
I don't know Plantinga as much.
Yeah, he's from I would have

247
00:11:53,280 --> 00:11:56,200
said this for sure, but now that
I had said on the podcast, a

248
00:11:56,200 --> 00:11:58,280
doubtful, but I'm pretty sure
he's at Notre Dame.

249
00:11:58,720 --> 00:12:02,640
But I think he's a Catholic
philosopher, but he's like a

250
00:12:02,640 --> 00:12:06,680
philosopher of religion.
Yeah, he's pretty famous 20th

251
00:12:06,680 --> 00:12:09,840
century philosopher.
William Lane Craig did a lot of

252
00:12:09,840 --> 00:12:13,920
studying underneath him.
OK, so I figure we could hit the

253
00:12:13,920 --> 00:12:17,720
big three versions and see how
it's the the the arguments kind

254
00:12:17,720 --> 00:12:25,040
of morphed over time.
And Selm in his Proslogion 2 and

255
00:12:25,040 --> 00:12:29,800
3 on his chapter 2 in existence
reality said that God is that

256
00:12:30,000 --> 00:12:32,480
which nothing greater can be
conceived.

257
00:12:33,200 --> 00:12:34,840
And then you're like, well, I
could think of something

258
00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:38,000
greater.
Well, as soon as you do, that is

259
00:12:38,000 --> 00:12:39,400
God.
Yeah, I gotcha.

260
00:12:39,400 --> 00:12:43,800
I gotcha.
God exists in the understanding

261
00:12:43,800 --> 00:12:47,560
and the mind.
A being that exists in reality

262
00:12:48,720 --> 00:12:51,800
is greater than one that merely
exists in the mind.

263
00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:56,160
So if God exists only in the
mind, we could conceive of

264
00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:59,640
something even greater.
A God that is has real

265
00:12:59,640 --> 00:13:03,640
existence, but that but that is
impossible since nothing is

266
00:13:03,640 --> 00:13:05,480
greater than God can be
conceived.

267
00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:07,200
Therefore, God exists in
reality.

268
00:13:09,480 --> 00:13:12,040
Yeah.
I mean, it's like, it's like it

269
00:13:12,240 --> 00:13:14,360
to me.
Like I get these and I've heard

270
00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:18,800
these things, but it does not
compute with me very well where

271
00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:21,120
it's like I get these
propositions, I can like

272
00:13:21,120 --> 00:13:25,440
replicate them for a test.
Did you have to replicate this

273
00:13:25,440 --> 00:13:29,080
for a test?
Yeah, like with Western, we I

274
00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:31,520
took a class in college that was
like themes in Western thought.

275
00:13:31,520 --> 00:13:35,120
And it just like you've read
major things and they, you know,

276
00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:37,080
I went to Chris college.
They always try to like combat

277
00:13:37,080 --> 00:13:38,760
stuff with this.
And so you learn about all these

278
00:13:38,760 --> 00:13:40,320
arguments, but not in a deep
level.

279
00:13:40,320 --> 00:13:43,160
Like you learn like little tag
lines and maybe you match or you

280
00:13:43,160 --> 00:13:45,840
you write something like this.
And so that's basically.

281
00:13:46,560 --> 00:13:50,840
So as so Amsalm was basically
saying, if we, if we agree to

282
00:13:50,840 --> 00:13:53,680
the premise that God is that
which nothing greater than can

283
00:13:53,680 --> 00:14:00,040
be conceived, then he must exist
because a God in the mind is

284
00:14:00,040 --> 00:14:01,600
less than a God that's really
real.

285
00:14:01,600 --> 00:14:03,800
That's really the kind of the,
the pivotal point.

286
00:14:04,600 --> 00:14:10,640
And so he writes on it again,
chapter 3, unnecessary

287
00:14:10,640 --> 00:14:12,960
existence, God is the greatest
conceivable being.

288
00:14:13,160 --> 00:14:15,920
Necessary existence is greater
than contingent existence.

289
00:14:16,400 --> 00:14:20,280
If God existed contingently, we
conceive of something greater,

290
00:14:20,600 --> 00:14:24,880
unnecessary God.
But nothing but nothing greater

291
00:14:24,880 --> 00:14:28,080
than God can be saved.
Therefore, God is necessary.

292
00:14:28,560 --> 00:14:30,320
I will say this, this just came
to my mind.

293
00:14:30,320 --> 00:14:32,200
I need to share with you this
article 'cause it's gonna,

294
00:14:32,200 --> 00:14:35,640
you're gonna get triggered.
We're basically talking about, I

295
00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:38,880
don't want to derail this, but
how we can trace like the

296
00:14:38,880 --> 00:14:43,920
downfall of like everything in
Christianity to Aquinas?

297
00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:47,040
It was great.
It was like it too too depend on

298
00:14:47,040 --> 00:14:50,520
natural law and got away from
scripture it too much Aristotle

299
00:14:50,520 --> 00:14:53,760
on Plato and not enough not God.
But I knew that you triggered.

300
00:14:53,960 --> 00:14:54,480
You.
I'm already.

301
00:14:54,520 --> 00:14:55,640
Triggered.
I should have said this to you,

302
00:14:55,640 --> 00:14:58,480
'cause it's great anyway, sorry,
'cause it's like, yeah, I

303
00:14:58,880 --> 00:15:02,960
anyway, yeah, I, I get these
arguments there and there's not

304
00:15:02,960 --> 00:15:05,280
a good coral.
Coral.

305
00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:08,720
There's no analogy like this is
the hard thing because like

306
00:15:08,720 --> 00:15:10,680
you're, I guess we'll address it
like with the maximally great

307
00:15:10,680 --> 00:15:12,760
pizza, like is it bad?
Because it's like not the

308
00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:15,800
greatest thing.
Like being so it only works like

309
00:15:15,800 --> 00:15:17,520
with one thing.
It's like a one of one thing.

310
00:15:17,520 --> 00:15:20,160
So it's it's hard 'cause there's
not a lot of analogies to go

311
00:15:20,160 --> 00:15:23,240
with it.
Yeah, and and this one.

312
00:15:24,680 --> 00:15:27,120
Like could you say that?
Could you be like the absolute

313
00:15:27,120 --> 00:15:29,920
worst thing is that like is
there something like that or not

314
00:15:29,920 --> 00:15:31,720
real?
It's like so you know.

315
00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:37,400
The worst thing in philosophy is
non existence if you don't

316
00:15:37,400 --> 00:15:39,400
exist.
That's the worst thing.

317
00:15:40,520 --> 00:15:44,440
And so if you, if you never were
conceived of, if you never, so

318
00:15:44,440 --> 00:15:49,960
in, in in Thomistic Thomas
Aquinas philosophy, there's

319
00:15:49,960 --> 00:15:57,160
different acts of existence.
So a horse has the first act of

320
00:15:57,160 --> 00:15:59,680
existence.
It really exists in reality.

321
00:16:00,160 --> 00:16:02,280
It also has the second act of
existence.

322
00:16:02,280 --> 00:16:04,640
It exists in our minds.
We know what a horse is in our

323
00:16:04,640 --> 00:16:07,480
mind.
A Unicorn exists only in the

324
00:16:07,480 --> 00:16:09,920
second act of existence.
We know what it is in our mind,

325
00:16:09,920 --> 00:16:11,520
but it doesn't actually exist in
reality.

326
00:16:11,960 --> 00:16:14,640
So I guess the worst thing would
be something that doesn't exist

327
00:16:14,640 --> 00:16:16,320
in the.
First or second one?

328
00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:17,400
Yeah, yeah.
Gotcha.

329
00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:18,480
OK.
I don't know.

330
00:16:18,480 --> 00:16:22,480
And that that's worse than being
an active agent that does bad

331
00:16:22,480 --> 00:16:25,640
things because you had no
existence like that, you know?

332
00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:34,720
Yeah, so there is an argument, A
defense against the problem of

333
00:16:34,720 --> 00:16:38,320
evil that goes along argues
along the lines that existence

334
00:16:38,320 --> 00:16:41,200
is better than non existence.
So why did God create stuff?

335
00:16:41,200 --> 00:16:45,320
Well, that he knew was going to
be evil because existence itself

336
00:16:45,320 --> 00:16:47,840
is good and God loves the thing
that exists.

337
00:16:47,840 --> 00:16:51,120
So there's a way that God loves
Satan even though we would

338
00:16:51,120 --> 00:16:54,040
typically say that he doesn't
love Satan, but he loves Satan

339
00:16:54,040 --> 00:16:57,360
because of the existence that he
has, you know, the the functions

340
00:16:57,360 --> 00:17:02,320
that he does.
Yeah, So, yeah, so this is we're

341
00:17:02,320 --> 00:17:05,920
going to instead of getting
bogged download, we're just

342
00:17:05,920 --> 00:17:12,720
going to go on to Leibniz
refinement of the carts.

343
00:17:13,079 --> 00:17:19,359
So Leibniz argued this guy's
also who came up with calculus

344
00:17:20,200 --> 00:17:26,880
along the same time as oh the
the the apple falling.

345
00:17:26,880 --> 00:17:28,200
Newton.
Newton.

346
00:17:28,440 --> 00:17:29,720
OK, that's what I thought but I
don't know enough.

347
00:17:29,800 --> 00:17:32,800
About yeah, OK, so pretty smart
guys.

348
00:17:33,240 --> 00:17:37,040
He says the ontological argument
succeeds only at the concept of

349
00:17:37,040 --> 00:17:42,120
the supremely perfect being is
coherent, so that he has given a

350
00:17:42,120 --> 00:17:46,520
way for you to potentially
derail this argument.

351
00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:51,240
If the concept of a supremely
perfect being is possible, then

352
00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:56,120
such a being exists necessarily.
OK, the concept of supremely

353
00:17:56,120 --> 00:17:59,720
perfect being is possible and
the liveness goes on to defend

354
00:17:59,720 --> 00:18:02,160
it in his in his writings.
And so then he's going to

355
00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:04,480
conclude that a supremely
perfect being exists

356
00:18:04,480 --> 00:18:08,000
necessarily.
So kind of takes what Descartes

357
00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:11,160
had written earlier, tightens it
up because Descartes didn't have

358
00:18:11,160 --> 00:18:16,120
the idea of coherence in his.
So, but this does give you an

359
00:18:16,120 --> 00:18:19,320
Ave. like if you're an atheist,
you could say, well, and some

360
00:18:19,320 --> 00:18:23,000
people have argued this, like
they've argued that omnipotence

361
00:18:23,320 --> 00:18:26,960
is incoherent.
So maybe you've heard, you know,

362
00:18:27,000 --> 00:18:31,480
if, if can God create a rock
that he can't live and that so

363
00:18:31,480 --> 00:18:35,400
that's trying to show the
incoherence of omnipotence.

364
00:18:35,720 --> 00:18:37,680
There's an answer to that.
We're not that's not this

365
00:18:37,680 --> 00:18:41,720
podcast, but there have been.
Can God give away his power?

366
00:18:42,080 --> 00:18:44,440
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
If he can, then he's not

367
00:18:44,600 --> 00:18:46,480
omnipotent.
If he can't, then he's not

368
00:18:46,480 --> 00:18:48,040
omnipotent.
So those types of things have

369
00:18:48,040 --> 00:18:50,800
been shown.
I don't think those ultimately

370
00:18:50,800 --> 00:18:54,360
go through, but they've been
raised up to try to show the

371
00:18:54,360 --> 00:18:59,440
incoherence of of omnipotence.
All right, so Kant came on the

372
00:18:59,440 --> 00:19:02,480
scene.
And if you know your

373
00:19:02,480 --> 00:19:05,360
philosophers, you know, as
someone who's been trained

374
00:19:05,640 --> 00:19:09,320
Thomistically, like I appreciate
what Kant did, but I don't agree

375
00:19:09,320 --> 00:19:11,560
with everything he did because
he's trying to answer some

376
00:19:11,560 --> 00:19:17,000
questions that he he accepts
some premises that he should

377
00:19:17,000 --> 00:19:19,400
never accept.
And so he, you know, does this

378
00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:25,480
thing of trying to take the
idealist and the, I can't think

379
00:19:25,480 --> 00:19:29,360
of the word for them, but Locke
and, and, and putting them back

380
00:19:29,360 --> 00:19:37,280
together, the imperialist.
So Kon's critique, he's going to

381
00:19:37,280 --> 00:19:40,560
say that existence is not a
predicate.

382
00:19:41,000 --> 00:19:46,200
And so the real thing here is
that we can say we're trying to

383
00:19:46,200 --> 00:19:47,920
think of something that's
really, really good.

384
00:19:49,120 --> 00:19:52,560
You know, this kombucha that
we're drinking, we could, we

385
00:19:52,560 --> 00:19:57,560
could describe a lot of its
essence, its nature, but exists.

386
00:19:57,600 --> 00:19:59,480
You know, I was talking about,
you know, the 1st and 2nd

387
00:19:59,480 --> 00:20:01,200
existence.
So.

388
00:20:02,240 --> 00:20:05,800
What we're saying is like you
can think of all the attributes

389
00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:10,720
of a Unicorn and that's what we
mean to predicate.

390
00:20:10,840 --> 00:20:13,720
So has four horses.
We're predicating of it that it

391
00:20:13,720 --> 00:20:18,760
has four, four horses, 4/4 legs,
it has a horn, it has a fur, has

392
00:20:18,760 --> 00:20:21,240
a mane, it has a tail, it has
muscles like this.

393
00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:27,000
All those things that we can
predicate about the Unicorn,

394
00:20:27,320 --> 00:20:29,440
he's saying existence is not one
of those things.

395
00:20:29,440 --> 00:20:32,640
You can't.
It's like it's a category error.

396
00:20:32,640 --> 00:20:36,400
It's what Khan is going to
argue, and so therefore he's

397
00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:40,720
going to say that these other
arguments that Anselm and

398
00:20:40,720 --> 00:20:45,120
Leibniz put through don't really
work because they're they're

399
00:20:45,120 --> 00:20:48,400
trying to predicate of this
maximally great being exist.

400
00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:50,760
It doesn't.
Necessarily have to exist.

401
00:20:50,760 --> 00:20:53,160
It could be something you'd
think of, but not an existing

402
00:20:53,160 --> 00:20:54,280
thing.
Yeah, I gotcha.

403
00:20:54,320 --> 00:20:55,120
OK, I see.
Yeah.

404
00:20:55,520 --> 00:20:58,520
So I think it kind of hits at
that maybe intuition that some

405
00:20:58,520 --> 00:21:03,200
people have that just because
you dream of something, it

406
00:21:03,200 --> 00:21:04,920
doesn't necessarily make it
exist.

407
00:21:04,920 --> 00:21:06,720
Like it's not something you can
predicate.

408
00:21:09,480 --> 00:21:14,640
So this is, you know how we
would, Thomas would reply, We

409
00:21:14,640 --> 00:21:18,280
distinguish between essence,
what something is, and existence

410
00:21:18,280 --> 00:21:22,560
that it is.
And we would agree with Kant

411
00:21:22,800 --> 00:21:27,880
that existence isn't necessarily
a predicate, but it's an act.

412
00:21:28,200 --> 00:21:32,320
So we would, we would say that
existence is being, it's like

413
00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:36,720
participating in reality, but
you can have different types of

414
00:21:36,720 --> 00:21:38,400
existence.
You can have necessary and

415
00:21:38,400 --> 00:21:43,520
contingent existence, and that
is where Godell and then there

416
00:21:43,760 --> 00:21:45,640
and then planting is going to
go.

417
00:21:45,640 --> 00:21:48,080
So they're going to take this
out of existence and

418
00:21:48,080 --> 00:21:53,440
nonexistence into necessary and
contingent and is.

419
00:21:53,520 --> 00:21:57,080
This going back to what we're
talking about at the top just to

420
00:21:57,080 --> 00:22:01,240
just to make some connection to
where mountain valley like right

421
00:22:01,400 --> 00:22:03,920
the shadow and light like you
need these things well.

422
00:22:03,960 --> 00:22:07,360
All of these kind of are on
though, so the archaeological

423
00:22:07,360 --> 00:22:10,280
argument is going to argue along
those lines no matter if you're

424
00:22:10,280 --> 00:22:13,840
at the top with Anselm or at the
bottom of plantica.

425
00:22:13,840 --> 00:22:15,880
So basic.
So they're saying like, oh, he's

426
00:22:15,880 --> 00:22:19,880
basically arguing because a
shadow exists now light has to

427
00:22:19,880 --> 00:22:21,400
exist, Correct?
Yeah.

428
00:22:22,320 --> 00:22:28,320
All right, so planting gut puts
it into modal, and that means

429
00:22:28,320 --> 00:22:33,680
modes of existence.
So and so he's going to say a

430
00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:37,080
maximally great being is defined
as an omniscient, omnipotent,

431
00:22:37,080 --> 00:22:40,080
morally perfect and existing
necessarily in every possible

432
00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:42,480
world.
OK, so that's what he's going to

433
00:22:42,480 --> 00:22:47,640
define up top and then he's
going to make this very modest

434
00:22:47,640 --> 00:22:51,280
claim.
It's possible that a maximally

435
00:22:51,280 --> 00:22:56,200
great being exist.
So for the atheist, someone or

436
00:22:56,200 --> 00:22:59,080
or or not, you could be a
theist, I guess.

437
00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:02,080
Well, you couldn't be a theist
for the atheist.

438
00:23:02,080 --> 00:23:06,160
In order to stop this argument
from going through, you have to

439
00:23:06,160 --> 00:23:10,920
deny this premise right here.
Because if you just like the

440
00:23:10,920 --> 00:23:13,920
camera.
Everything else must follow.

441
00:23:14,280 --> 00:23:16,560
Right.
Once you allow premise 2, it's

442
00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:18,800
possible that a maximally great
being exists.

443
00:23:18,840 --> 00:23:24,800
Everything else follows moldly.
3 If it is possible, then a

444
00:23:24,800 --> 00:23:27,560
maximally great being exists in
some possible worlds.

445
00:23:27,560 --> 00:23:30,520
So what we're saying is of all
the worlds you could dream up,

446
00:23:30,520 --> 00:23:33,960
doesn't necessarily mean that
there's this world ensemble out

447
00:23:33,960 --> 00:23:37,080
there, but of all the possible
worlds that we could think of.

448
00:23:37,280 --> 00:23:41,160
If there, if a maximally great
being is possible, then that

449
00:23:41,160 --> 00:23:42,800
being is going to be in some of
these possible worlds.

450
00:23:43,720 --> 00:23:46,880
If it's not in any of those
possible worlds, then it's not

451
00:23:46,880 --> 00:23:49,160
possible.
So if it is possible, it's going

452
00:23:49,160 --> 00:23:50,600
to be in some of those possible
worlds.

453
00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:54,720
Now we're going to say, if a
maximally great being exists in

454
00:23:54,720 --> 00:24:00,120
some possible world, then it
exists in all possible worlds,

455
00:24:00,240 --> 00:24:03,240
since necessary existence cannot
be confined.

456
00:24:03,640 --> 00:24:06,880
So since we've already said that
a maximally great being exists

457
00:24:06,880 --> 00:24:10,560
necessarily, if it exists in
some possible worlds, that it

458
00:24:10,560 --> 00:24:14,560
has to exist in all possible
worlds, and we're living in a

459
00:24:14,560 --> 00:24:17,120
possible world, we're living in
the actual world.

460
00:24:17,400 --> 00:24:20,840
So if it exists in all possible
worlds, then it exists in the

461
00:24:20,880 --> 00:24:23,560
actual world.
Therefore, a maximally great

462
00:24:23,560 --> 00:24:26,640
being does actually exist.
This one, to me, makes more

463
00:24:26,640 --> 00:24:27,160
sense.
Yeah.

464
00:24:27,560 --> 00:24:28,840
Like it's easier to follow.
Yeah.

465
00:24:28,840 --> 00:24:32,240
I think it is refined 'cause
it's, yeah, I think it tried to.

466
00:24:32,480 --> 00:24:38,640
It captures what the older folks
were trying to say, but in in in

467
00:24:38,640 --> 00:24:42,720
a way that's more defensible and
more logically sound.

468
00:24:43,160 --> 00:24:46,040
Yeah, I mean, maybe we're in the
matrix.

469
00:24:47,240 --> 00:24:49,200
Maybe we're in the matrix.
Yeah.

470
00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:53,600
So it avoids cons critique.
So we we stopped talking about

471
00:24:53,600 --> 00:24:56,400
existence and non existence.
We just talked about, you know,

472
00:24:56,800 --> 00:25:03,120
possible and we, we moved it all
to modal logic and, and you can

473
00:25:03,120 --> 00:25:08,560
predicate necessity, you can
predicate contingency because

474
00:25:08,560 --> 00:25:10,440
you can say you're a contingent
being that's a, you're

475
00:25:10,440 --> 00:25:14,720
predicating of that.
So it avoids Kant's, you know

476
00:25:14,720 --> 00:25:19,760
what he came up with.
So and so basically the atheist

477
00:25:19,760 --> 00:25:23,320
just going to say this, this
maximal great being can't exist

478
00:25:23,560 --> 00:25:27,720
or it's like not not possible.
Like, yeah, you'd either have to

479
00:25:27,720 --> 00:25:29,080
take out the first or second
premise.

480
00:25:29,080 --> 00:25:33,360
You'd either have to say that
how he is defined A maximally

481
00:25:33,360 --> 00:25:36,560
great being is wrong and it's
not.

482
00:25:36,880 --> 00:25:39,400
You would have to say you'd have
to show that maximally great

483
00:25:39,400 --> 00:25:42,520
being is not a necessary being.
I think that'd be difficult to

484
00:25:42,520 --> 00:25:48,840
do because you could always show
that a necessary being is better

485
00:25:48,840 --> 00:25:52,920
than a contingent being, so that
one would be difficult to do.

486
00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:57,600
And then you'd have to show that
the second premise is false,

487
00:25:57,600 --> 00:25:59,400
that it's not possible for their
being met.

488
00:25:59,840 --> 00:26:02,520
And so some people are like,
there's not a single maximally,

489
00:26:02,520 --> 00:26:04,680
some people argued this way,
there's not a single maximally

490
00:26:04,680 --> 00:26:06,720
greatest being.
It's like gradations and you can

491
00:26:06,720 --> 00:26:08,080
just keep getting better, keep
getting better.

492
00:26:08,080 --> 00:26:09,600
And there's not a single one up
there.

493
00:26:09,600 --> 00:26:11,960
They try to get around it that
way, but I don't know that that

494
00:26:13,160 --> 00:26:15,240
that that works as that goes.
Through yeah, let's, I'm

495
00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:19,720
curious, yeah, objecting.
Right, so there is this idea of

496
00:26:20,320 --> 00:26:23,720
of, you know, the, you know, the
the greatest possible island,

497
00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:26,800
the greatest possible pizza.
The problem with the this is

498
00:26:26,800 --> 00:26:29,720
these are by their very nature
contingent.

499
00:26:30,400 --> 00:26:31,880
OK.
Yeah, not necessary.

500
00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:38,720
It is logically inconsistent to
try to conceive of a necessary

501
00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:42,800
pizza, a pizza that exists in
every possible world.

502
00:26:43,240 --> 00:26:45,640
Yeah.
Things that are made out of

503
00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:49,000
matter are, by definition,
contingent.

504
00:26:49,480 --> 00:26:52,080
Yeah.
So I mean, what, what could you

505
00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:55,920
go to that's not matter, That's
not maximally.

506
00:26:55,960 --> 00:26:58,800
Could you do a?
Could you do this with like

507
00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:01,040
just?
I don't know.

508
00:27:01,280 --> 00:27:03,880
So if you get matter out of it,
then we're talking about some

509
00:27:03,880 --> 00:27:06,720
abstract object.
And so then are we talking about

510
00:27:06,720 --> 00:27:12,840
a concrete abstract object or a
non concrete abstract object?

511
00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:17,000
So a concrete abstract object
would be something like God who

512
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:18,760
can stand in causal
relationships.

513
00:27:19,160 --> 00:27:24,520
A non concrete would be
something like a Platonic form,

514
00:27:25,560 --> 00:27:29,280
like the form of the number 3,
the form of triangleness, the

515
00:27:29,280 --> 00:27:33,880
form of Tubinus, you know, the
coordinate Plato, everything

516
00:27:33,880 --> 00:27:36,480
that we have down here, there's
some form.

517
00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:38,920
Now we can debate whether those
exist or not, but that's the

518
00:27:39,080 --> 00:27:41,640
that would be the realm that we
are automatically being pushed

519
00:27:41,640 --> 00:27:45,320
into because we're looking for
something that's not contingent.

520
00:27:45,960 --> 00:27:48,480
Gotcha.
So that's why these island ones

521
00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:49,720
don't go.
Through they don't make sense,

522
00:27:49,760 --> 00:27:52,120
Yeah.
They kind of miss the idea of

523
00:27:52,160 --> 00:27:58,000
contingency versus necessary.
And it's hard to think of what a

524
00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:00,400
nationally great island is
because what you want on an

525
00:28:00,400 --> 00:28:04,040
island, what I want on an island
are are different because

526
00:28:04,040 --> 00:28:08,200
they're contingent, right?
Whereas in a God, when you start

527
00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:12,600
like getting things down to and
this is that, you know, we would

528
00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:18,200
talk about God being simple in
his being versus US who are not

529
00:28:18,200 --> 00:28:20,160
simple.
We we're composed of parts.

530
00:28:20,160 --> 00:28:23,440
We have all these things.
So when you simplify the oneness

531
00:28:23,440 --> 00:28:26,240
of God, existence itself and all
those things, then it's easier

532
00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:29,200
to talk.
It's easier to, it's not just

533
00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:31,520
that it's easy that makes it
possible, but you can see how

534
00:28:31,520 --> 00:28:32,800
there could be a maximally
great.

535
00:28:33,360 --> 00:28:37,880
And so planting that can define
here is what a maximally great

536
00:28:37,920 --> 00:28:40,720
being is and puts those things
out there.

537
00:28:40,720 --> 00:28:42,920
I don't even know that you could
define what a maximally great

538
00:28:42,920 --> 00:28:46,280
pizza is.
Definitely not pineapple on.

539
00:28:46,360 --> 00:28:47,240
Pizza.
Right.

540
00:28:47,240 --> 00:28:49,520
Is that?
And and then, and then some

541
00:28:49,520 --> 00:28:50,600
people would be like,
definitely.

542
00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:56,480
Pineapple so but but same thing
like I feel like you talked to

543
00:28:56,480 --> 00:29:02,280
100 different people while they
might agree on an all loving

544
00:29:02,280 --> 00:29:05,080
God, I don't know what that
means.

545
00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:07,400
I mean, do you know what I mean?
Like some people would be like

546
00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:12,120
all loving means accepting of
everybody no matter what and

547
00:29:12,120 --> 00:29:14,960
condoning everyone's actions.
No, maybe not all of you.

548
00:29:14,960 --> 00:29:16,960
So all of you, it's just
powerful and knowing.

549
00:29:16,960 --> 00:29:20,040
So love is not part of.
Omniscient, omnipotent, morally

550
00:29:20,080 --> 00:29:25,440
perfect.
So, yeah, so you could, you

551
00:29:25,440 --> 00:29:27,960
could debate.
So this is a a question of

552
00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:33,000
epistemology versus ontology.
Like how do we know what morally

553
00:29:33,000 --> 00:29:34,960
perfect is?
What is moral perfection?

554
00:29:35,040 --> 00:29:38,120
Can we know that versus does it
exist?

555
00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:42,840
So you could have people who
have a lesser understanding of

556
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:46,640
moral perfection that would
maybe let murderers go free

557
00:29:46,800 --> 00:29:50,760
versus someone who's like, no,
we value human life so much that

558
00:29:50,760 --> 00:29:52,120
we're not going to let murderers
go free.

559
00:29:52,480 --> 00:29:55,040
So that would be like a, but
that wouldn't.

560
00:29:55,040 --> 00:30:00,360
I don't know that that would
because you could basically you

561
00:30:00,360 --> 00:30:04,320
could argue we don't necessarily
know what moral perfection is.

562
00:30:04,320 --> 00:30:04,960
We disagree.
We.

563
00:30:04,960 --> 00:30:05,880
Don't know.
Yeah, yeah, 'cause.

564
00:30:06,320 --> 00:30:08,720
I I don't know that that would
embe against this argument

565
00:30:08,720 --> 00:30:11,120
'cause they're just saying that
there is some being who is

566
00:30:11,120 --> 00:30:12,480
morally perfect even if we
don't.

567
00:30:12,480 --> 00:30:14,320
We don't know what it.
Is what that is, yeah.

568
00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:20,120
So that is the ontological
argument.

569
00:30:20,680 --> 00:30:22,160
You're probably left a little
underwhelmed.

570
00:30:23,000 --> 00:30:24,640
Yeah, I, I think I, I did like
that.

571
00:30:25,440 --> 00:30:30,280
Like I think it makes sense that
if it has to be there, it will

572
00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:33,120
be there.
I just, I don't, I don't love it

573
00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:34,240
though.
It's not, it's not as

574
00:30:34,240 --> 00:30:36,640
satisfying.
When I first was introduced to

575
00:30:36,640 --> 00:30:40,120
it, I didn't love it.
I I couldn't say that if I'm

576
00:30:40,120 --> 00:30:41,240
talking to someone on the
street.

577
00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:43,080
Let me tell you.
Yeah, yeah, I'm not starting

578
00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:44,560
without the ontological
argument.

579
00:30:44,560 --> 00:30:48,960
Great comfort on the side, yeah.
I think it is a very.

580
00:30:50,280 --> 00:30:53,520
It's like if you enjoy
mathematical proofs, yeah, like,

581
00:30:53,600 --> 00:30:57,040
hey, I can prove to you that
sqrt 2 is an irrational number

582
00:30:57,800 --> 00:31:00,080
and you're like, oh, wow, that
is a cool proof.

583
00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:04,120
Like, if you can enjoy proofs
for the proof's sake, then I

584
00:31:04,120 --> 00:31:06,560
think this is probably an
argument that you're going to

585
00:31:06,560 --> 00:31:08,440
like.
If you didn't like geometry in

586
00:31:08,440 --> 00:31:11,720
school and you didn't like using
siding aside and all that stuff,

587
00:31:12,440 --> 00:31:14,360
this is probably not the the
argument.

588
00:31:14,360 --> 00:31:17,640
That's great.
I I love the like witnessing,

589
00:31:18,160 --> 00:31:20,840
choose your own adventure
witnessing be like, hey, you

590
00:31:20,840 --> 00:31:23,680
want to talk about sqrt 2 or do
you want to talk about, you

591
00:31:23,680 --> 00:31:27,120
know, like and like, all right,
you chose ontological argument.

592
00:31:27,120 --> 00:31:30,240
Here we go.
You chose the moral argument.

593
00:31:30,240 --> 00:31:30,920
Here we go.
It's.

594
00:31:30,920 --> 00:31:33,800
Just like you know that actually
we we need to patent that to

595
00:31:33,880 --> 00:31:35,360
choose your own adventure
witnessing.

596
00:31:35,800 --> 00:31:37,600
That's great.
You say something in that.

597
00:31:37,600 --> 00:31:39,680
That's like a decision tree, a
flow chart we follow.

598
00:31:39,680 --> 00:31:41,840
It's good.
All right, so we're only we're

599
00:31:41,840 --> 00:31:45,600
not, we got time.
So there has been recently

600
00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:50,840
recently developed a new
argument that's like a brother

601
00:31:50,840 --> 00:31:52,960
argument to the ontological
argument.

602
00:31:52,960 --> 00:31:55,800
Tell me more.
The modal argument from

603
00:31:55,800 --> 00:32:02,960
beginnings by Pruss and
Rasmussen and this one's even I

604
00:32:02,960 --> 00:32:06,320
like this because it's even the
beginning premises.

605
00:32:06,360 --> 00:32:10,320
It's like the nose of the camel
is even less offensive than than

606
00:32:10,320 --> 00:32:14,400
plant cows.
And so it says for any positive

607
00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:20,200
state, a state of affairs S that
can begin to exist.

608
00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:23,760
It is possible there is an
external cause of S.

609
00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:28,440
So what it's saying is so if let
me break that down to for you.

610
00:32:29,000 --> 00:32:33,480
If it's going, it's worded
funny, but a contingent.

611
00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:36,440
If something begins to exist, it
has to be contingent.

612
00:32:36,480 --> 00:32:40,480
OK, so another way of saying
this is, if I were to rephrase

613
00:32:40,480 --> 00:32:45,840
this one, is if a contingent
state of affairs can begin to

614
00:32:45,840 --> 00:32:49,320
exist, then it's possible that
there is an external cause of

615
00:32:49,320 --> 00:32:51,320
this.
And.

616
00:32:51,400 --> 00:32:55,360
You'd be like, yeah, that that
seems that checks up.

617
00:32:55,840 --> 00:33:00,240
Second premise, it is possible
that the state of affairs

618
00:33:00,760 --> 00:33:04,600
contingent, let me it is
possible that the state of

619
00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:09,360
affairs contingent concrete
beings exist begins to obtain

620
00:33:10,280 --> 00:33:14,800
contingent concrete beings exist
begins to obtain.

621
00:33:14,800 --> 00:33:18,720
So it's just saying that it's
possible that contingent

622
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:23,520
concrete beings begin to exist
that that that comes about.

623
00:33:24,400 --> 00:33:28,240
If one and two, then it is
possible that a necessary

624
00:33:28,240 --> 00:33:31,240
concrete being exists.
That makes sense, yeah.

625
00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:35,880
If it is possible that a
necessary concrete being exists,

626
00:33:36,200 --> 00:33:40,640
then it exists.
Therefore a necessary concrete

627
00:33:40,760 --> 00:33:43,920
being exists.
So, so basically if I order word

628
00:33:43,920 --> 00:33:47,160
this, you know, in layman's
term, it's basically saying that

629
00:33:47,200 --> 00:33:52,640
if a contingent state of affairs
can come into being, and that

630
00:33:52,640 --> 00:33:58,640
contingent state of affairs can
be a contingent concrete being,

631
00:33:59,480 --> 00:34:04,880
then it's possible that a
necessary concrete being exists.

632
00:34:04,880 --> 00:34:07,840
And if it's only possible,
again, that a necessary concrete

633
00:34:07,840 --> 00:34:11,560
being exists by modal logic,
then it has to exist in every

634
00:34:11,560 --> 00:34:13,600
possible world and therefore it
exists.

635
00:34:13,600 --> 00:34:18,679
Boom.
What can you walk through what?

636
00:34:18,679 --> 00:34:19,960
What's the definition of a
being?

637
00:34:21,440 --> 00:34:24,800
Anything that exists.
Any anything a being is a thing.

638
00:34:24,800 --> 00:34:27,600
OK, gotcha.
OK, so so so it's it could be

639
00:34:27,600 --> 00:34:31,520
like a force of sorts.
Like it's like it's, it's not

640
00:34:31,520 --> 00:34:35,760
necessarily personal at all.
Yes.

641
00:34:35,760 --> 00:34:37,080
By definition, it doesn't have
to be you.

642
00:34:37,080 --> 00:34:37,719
Gotcha.
Yeah.

643
00:34:39,360 --> 00:34:41,920
Yeah.
A well, a yeah, All forces that

644
00:34:41,920 --> 00:34:45,520
we know have their heart in
matter.

645
00:34:46,560 --> 00:34:50,360
So the force of gravity is
matter tracking is force of

646
00:34:50,360 --> 00:34:54,920
electromagnetism is like
charges, you know, electrons and

647
00:34:54,920 --> 00:34:58,600
stuff like that.
So I don't know, I'm trying to

648
00:34:58,600 --> 00:35:05,440
think of the physics of that.
You could have a world where I'm

649
00:35:05,440 --> 00:35:10,800
trying to think through if you
had a world that just had pure

650
00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:15,760
vacuum energy.
Sorry, you would still have the

651
00:35:15,800 --> 00:35:19,120
particle pair of production out
of that vacuum energy layer, so

652
00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:21,960
I don't know how you could have
a force exist without having

653
00:35:21,960 --> 00:35:24,440
some matter exist along with it.
That's all I'm saying.

654
00:35:24,440 --> 00:35:29,280
OK, so going back, so a being is
just anything?

655
00:35:29,640 --> 00:35:30,640
Sure, something.
That exists.

656
00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:38,000
So like like so like like you're
saying like gravity is a being

657
00:35:38,000 --> 00:35:42,040
or electromagnetic?
Charge gravity is a being.

658
00:35:42,040 --> 00:35:47,560
Gravity is a an effect we see
that happens when 2 being

659
00:35:47,640 --> 00:35:51,080
between two beings.
OK, so like 2 planets or two

660
00:35:51,080 --> 00:35:52,680
beings, Right.
OK, gotcha.

661
00:35:52,680 --> 00:35:55,760
That that's confusing that that
helps me out to where a being is

662
00:35:55,760 --> 00:35:59,040
really vague and doesn't mean
much.

663
00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:01,840
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
Yeah, it's something that that

664
00:36:02,240 --> 00:36:04,760
that's concrete.
So what we're saying is not

665
00:36:04,760 --> 00:36:10,080
abstract like something
something not platonic.

666
00:36:10,280 --> 00:36:11,760
Gotcha.
Yeah, that makes sense.

667
00:36:12,120 --> 00:36:15,840
Yep.
So again, it follows the same

668
00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:19,320
modal structure as the
ontological argument goes from

669
00:36:19,320 --> 00:36:23,360
possible to necessary to actual.
This time it doesn't start with

670
00:36:23,360 --> 00:36:27,040
a concept of God, but with
possible beginnings and it

671
00:36:27,040 --> 00:36:30,920
converges on a necessary
concrete being that's there.

672
00:36:31,360 --> 00:36:34,360
And so the the beauty of this is
the premises are very, very

673
00:36:34,360 --> 00:36:38,120
modest to begin with.
It's like hard to deny those,

674
00:36:38,520 --> 00:36:42,840
but then it then it ends in, you
know that so.

675
00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:44,560
Boom.
So yeah.

676
00:36:44,560 --> 00:36:49,520
So people to disagree or try to
disprove this, What?

677
00:36:49,520 --> 00:36:52,480
What do you say?
That external causes aren't not

678
00:36:52,480 --> 00:36:54,720
necess?
Not necessary.

679
00:36:54,720 --> 00:36:56,800
Causes don't always cause
contingent things.

680
00:36:56,920 --> 00:36:58,240
Is that like what you have to
say?

681
00:36:58,600 --> 00:37:00,480
To to get around this most
recent one.

682
00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:04,440
This is so recent I've only
heard it I I've not heard an

683
00:37:04,440 --> 00:37:07,080
atheist response to this so I
don't know.

684
00:37:07,080 --> 00:37:09,280
How it is, maybe drop in the
comments.

685
00:37:09,280 --> 00:37:13,440
Maybe we'll maybe we'll hear the
1st. 1 So I don't if I were to

686
00:37:13,440 --> 00:37:19,120
try to it's I'm trying to put my
mind, put myself in the.

687
00:37:19,120 --> 00:37:20,800
Atheist.
I'm just thinking of good titles

688
00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:23,640
for this video.
It's like atheists have no

689
00:37:23,640 --> 00:37:26,280
answer.
It'll get.

690
00:37:26,280 --> 00:37:28,280
It'll get.
Not just to get just to.

691
00:37:28,320 --> 00:37:30,400
Get engagement Engagement.
Yeah.

692
00:37:30,640 --> 00:37:33,600
Well, yeah, just so we can, we
can, we can learn what the

693
00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:34,760
pushback would be.
All right.

694
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:37,440
Yeah, that would definitely I'm.
Not saying in a bad way, but you

695
00:37:37,440 --> 00:37:39,360
know, yeah, yeah.
Anyway, atheists don't have an

696
00:37:39,360 --> 00:37:42,920
answer that Michael knows of.
That's great.

697
00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:47,080
That'll be good.
I hope we get some, you know,

698
00:37:47,080 --> 00:37:48,720
back and forth on this.
That'll be good.

699
00:37:49,320 --> 00:37:53,760
Yeah, I, I guess, well, places
where you could so, so the first

700
00:37:53,760 --> 00:37:57,240
premise is for any positive
state of affairs S that can

701
00:37:57,240 --> 00:38:00,200
begin to obtain, it's possible
there is an external cause of

702
00:38:00,200 --> 00:38:04,080
this.
So I guess you could argue that

703
00:38:04,080 --> 00:38:07,880
everything is just a brute fact
that's not caused that there's

704
00:38:07,880 --> 00:38:10,560
no causal relationships.
Like the first principle of

705
00:38:10,560 --> 00:38:12,760
causality doesn't isn't, doesn't
hold.

706
00:38:12,760 --> 00:38:17,800
But that's I think there are
people that that would argue

707
00:38:17,800 --> 00:38:22,520
that way, but it's a very fringe
thing.

708
00:38:23,520 --> 00:38:27,520
So if you ever, if you just said
everything is a brute fact, it's

709
00:38:27,520 --> 00:38:31,800
all determined.
But even then, you see, you

710
00:38:31,800 --> 00:38:36,640
still see things coming into
existence that you would, I

711
00:38:36,640 --> 00:38:38,720
think naturally say that there
are causes, even if they're

712
00:38:38,720 --> 00:38:43,280
determined causes.
It's possible that the state

713
00:38:43,280 --> 00:38:46,720
affairs contingent concrete
beings exist begins to obtain.

714
00:38:47,200 --> 00:38:51,560
I mean, I think we see
contingent concrete beings

715
00:38:51,560 --> 00:38:53,960
exist.
So it'd be, you'd have to deny

716
00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:56,880
that, that there are contingent
concrete beings that have

717
00:38:56,880 --> 00:38:58,960
obtained.
So I think it's a, it's a very,

718
00:38:58,960 --> 00:39:03,760
very modest argument.
So we'll see where it goes.

719
00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:07,440
Maybe it'll it'll stand next to
the ontological argument in the

720
00:39:07,440 --> 00:39:08,520
future.
I love it.

721
00:39:08,680 --> 00:39:11,600
Just keep adding them, you know?
Yeah, that's great.

722
00:39:12,560 --> 00:39:14,840
Awesome.
Well, any.

723
00:39:15,000 --> 00:39:17,560
So have we.
Is there any argument stone left

724
00:39:17,560 --> 00:39:19,080
unturned?
I'm sure there is stuff we

725
00:39:19,080 --> 00:39:23,960
haven't touched, but you know I.
Think we touched on the problem

726
00:39:23,960 --> 00:39:28,360
of evil when we talked about the
moral argument, but we didn't

727
00:39:28,360 --> 00:39:31,880
give like a full.
Yeah, we should do that one

728
00:39:31,880 --> 00:39:32,760
sometime that.
'D be good.

729
00:39:32,760 --> 00:39:34,080
What's the what?
I can't think of the word.

730
00:39:34,120 --> 00:39:35,480
Theodicy.
Theodicy.

731
00:39:35,480 --> 00:39:36,360
Yeah, Yeah.
Thank you.

732
00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:37,840
I like that word, yeah.
I'm getting old.

733
00:39:37,840 --> 00:39:40,240
I can't think of all the words
we haven't, We haven't really

734
00:39:40,240 --> 00:39:43,640
explored some of the theodicies
like the the soul making

735
00:39:43,640 --> 00:39:45,480
theodicy.
We should do that that'd.

736
00:39:45,480 --> 00:39:47,600
Be good, Yeah.
So maybe, maybe we can do that

737
00:39:47,600 --> 00:39:48,640
sometime.
Love it.

738
00:39:48,640 --> 00:39:51,880
Well, man, add it to the
playlist of arguments.

739
00:39:51,880 --> 00:39:53,720
We got like a we got a bunch of
episodes lined up.

740
00:39:53,720 --> 00:39:54,400
That is good.
Yeah.

741
00:39:54,760 --> 00:39:57,080
Hopefully we'll get some good
engagement here.

742
00:39:57,080 --> 00:40:01,960
So thanks for hanging with us.
Through this argument, that's

743
00:40:01,960 --> 00:40:05,160
our take.
Thanks for listening to Take

744
00:40:05,160 --> 00:40:07,360
Two.
Find us wherever you find

745
00:40:07,360 --> 00:40:09,880
podcasts and on YouTube for
those who want to watch our

746
00:40:09,880 --> 00:40:10,560
video cast.