I Think, Therefore I Am | Part 2

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All right, well, if you want to
know more about this podcast,

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yeah, just ask ChatGPT.
Chat knows everything somehow,

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somehow.
I wish you could get like should

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ask it like where, where, where
did you pull?

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Did you listen to the episode?
Did you pull it from somewhere?

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What's the you know, what were
we doing?

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So I'd be curious, you know, for
all of our listeners out there.

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And it seems like I don't, I
don't know how this works.

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You know, especially when we
first started out, like numbers

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didn't mean anything to me.
But now I look at numbers and

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like I was surprised at how fast
our YouTube numbers went up and

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our Spotify numbers are like
meh.

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And our YouTube numbers are kind
of like.

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Plateaued I'm.
Like what?

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Like.
I know we were, yeah, yeah,

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that's true.
We were getting subscribers and

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it's like it has like it was
like going up crazy, like very

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routine and then it has
definitely leveled off.

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Yeah, just kind of plateaued,
but our Spotify.

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Spotify.
It's like we're getting six a

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month or something.
I don't, I don't know which is

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the slow growth, but everything
I've read like not that we, you

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know, we're probably not going
to be the next Wes Huff.

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You know, Hey Wes, we're coming
from Hey Papyrus 52, maybe 1

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episode.
Yeah, we're on your corner.

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Watch out.
But you know, everything I've

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heard is is podcasts that do
eventually make it.

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They all start off with this
slow growth.

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And then there's like this, you
know, whip that comes up.

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So I'll just say, you know, if
you do joy, enjoy and listen,

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you know, interaction does help
the algorithm and we do our best

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to give you some, you know,
both.

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I I think our goal is not
seminary.

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Yeah, yeah, yeah.
But not, you know.

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Yeah, not.
Nothing.

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Yeah, not nothing.
But not it's great.

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I mean, 'cause sometimes when I
think of a podcast, I do think

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you are very deep doctrinally,
but just just, you know, I, I, I

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think everything chat said is
very positive about you, but I'm

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inserting negative.
You're just cold and unrelatable

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and, you know, just.
So the Baxter, I don't know why

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she did, but Chloe was like just
asked ChatGPT about our podcast

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and it came up with what I would
consider.

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So some surprisingly accurate
descriptions of the podcast and

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of our personalities.
And like some of I I wonder

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because it can pull we have some
stuff on our web page.

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We should probably promote our
web page, but it's in the Doobly

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Doo below.
We do have a web page where you

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can kind of go back and see all
of our podcasts and stuff and

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and see, see, see stuff like
that.

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But so there's like some
biographical stuff there.

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There's some biographical stuff
on our church's website that it

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can pull.
So I wonder is it just like OK,

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given Michael's back educational
background and and the things he

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put that he.
Likes Oh yeah.

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Does it extrapolate?
He's going to be.

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Because I have it up right now,
it says you're thoughtful and

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analytical, your backgrounds in
engineering and philosophy,

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loves deep theology and
apologetics.

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It also does say Mormon
relational.

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So we don't have, you know, so
you, you're, you get it.

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It says Zach is engaging and
personable as a physical

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therapist.
I love this.

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And father, you know, he's very
relational like that.

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That.
Yeah.

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Like I'm not a father.
Yeah, yeah.

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Exactly, it's so funny, light
but serious where it matters.

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Pastoral and pastoral style
communicator are dynamic

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together.
I don't know where Pat where

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Chad got this, but
conversational and humble must

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have been.
Here in a lot humble group of

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podcasters out there.
One of my favorite verses Moses

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ever wrote that he was like the
most humble person.

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Balance of humor and depth.
It's great.

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In short, Michael is the
analytical thinker who loves

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deep doctrine, which is like, I
don't know what that means about

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me.
Zach is the approachable real

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life communicator who keeps the
conversation grounded and

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engaging.
Together, they're thoughtful,

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friendly and earnest about
helping listeners think deeply

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about their faith.
So you know, there you go.

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Yeah, yeah, yeah.
I I just curious how how it came

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up with that?
Oh yeah, If it did take like

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engineer and father and run with
it, you know what I mean?

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Like that, You know what I mean?
Yeah.

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Yeah, you know, you know, yeah,
these stereotypes were just

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going to pigeonhole men.
So I'm curious, if you know

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you're a listener, you could go
to Grok or ChatGPT or Gemini or.

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Claude Perplexity.
One of these.

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Yeah, and ask, you know, what do
you know about the take to a

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theology podcast?
See what it says.

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So I'd be interested to to know.
We should have yeah, I guess it

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could look up pictures of it.
I would.

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I would love it for it to like
draw a picture of us just based

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on the audio, like just just
see, you know what I mean?

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That would.
Be crazy, that's.

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Great.
I bet, I bet it would get some

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Patriots gear on there like I'm
trying to think I've had to, you

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know, I've had to pick how it
would, how it would do it.

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But yeah, yeah.
Anyway, yeah, leave it to chat,

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you know?
Yeah, and with as often you've

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you've mentioned, it probably
have me like full fall in the

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mouth kissing Tom Brady or
something like that.

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Oh, Oh my.
Goodness gracious yet, Tom.

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Brady, I think I From all I can
tell, Drake is a believer.

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Is he?
I haven't thought, but yeah, to

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see, is it like the way he posts
game interviews or like what?

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He doesn't say stuff like that.
So it like, I don't know if he

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may, you know.
'Cause that's the, that's how,

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that's the best way to tell
someone's a true Christian is

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that they say, I think God
first.

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Right, right.
That's the only way you know, I

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don't take away from.
That I think that's good.

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I I should not.
I'm not minimizing.

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That much?
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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But I did some research and it
seems like maybe he is.

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Oh yeah.
Yeah, it's, it's and it's, it's

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always difficult to to.
Pre meal oatmeal, that's the

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most important.
Yeah, I 'cause I can't.

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Get with.
Post Trib pre meal.

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So I was like, you know.
Oh my goodness.

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Yeah, crazy.
Yeah.

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So that that's our podcast.
So we are going to continue on

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into the.
We should, we should ask.

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Yeah, we should ask chat.
Who do you think came up with

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the Descartes series?
I bet it would know.

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That'd be interesting to ask.
Like, which podcast do you think

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Michael drove versus Zach?
Like just by topic, you know

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it'd be.
Interesting.

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Well, I find it, I think, well,
no, we're just shooting the

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breeze here.
I think you can come in on my

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notes better than I can yours.
Like I it's difficult for me to

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to but.
It is hard to get into sides,

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get into someone's head with
notes like what are they

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thinking when they say this
word?

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It is tricky, yeah.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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So on the your podcast, I think
you do more of the talking than

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what I do on my podcast.
Which I try to.

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But him I'm like, I don't know,
he's got that song.

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I.
I find the same thing with

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sometimes some of this stuff.
It's like, I don't know, you

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know, like I, I, I don't want
to.

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I don't want to just say words,
just to say words, but you know

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what I mean?
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

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So it's good.
It's great.

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All right.
Well, I think we're going to

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take it to the next level.
Let's fire up that twanga music.

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From the hearts of the Low
Country in South Carolina.

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It's the Take Two podcast where
we take theology to the next

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level.
All right, I think therefore I

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am maybe a quick reboot.
Just a recap.

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We talked about Aristotle and
how he was a third of these huge

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philosophers had a big impact.
His writings were lost refound

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around 900 in the Islamic world.
Ish.

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And then that started floating
into the European world around

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1000 or so.
By 1100, he's translated, he's

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in these universities.
You could refer to him as the

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philosopher and people knew who
you were talking about.

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And really he reigned supreme
for 203 hundred years till we

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start getting some cracks.
We talked about William of Occam

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and some, you know, having some
philosophical differences.

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And then we have this Copernican
revolution.

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We kick out all of his bad
science, physics, and we also

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kick out the metaphysics.
So this time of like, how do we

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know what we believe?
And we talked last time about

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these two schools of thought,
the idealist and the empiricist.

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The empiricist would say we
learn everything from physical

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interactions.
Idealists would say what we

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really should do is find some
true ideals like geometry axioms

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and build on those, like just
logically build up.

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So Descartes is one of those
idealists.

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He's a mathematician as well.
And so this this method really

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sits well with him.
And so he because there's this

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turmoil over what we can
believe, what we shouldn't

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believe, our senses being lied
to, because we can see, we can

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show times where they're.
Yeah, perception is weird.

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Yeah, yeah.
And so that's what he starts

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doing.
So there's this.

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He writes a book called
Meditations that and if you're

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interested, it's not that
difficult of a read.

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Not.
I'm just kidding.

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Not.
Really, is it, is it like a, is

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it like a like a big textbook or
is it like a skinny 100 page

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book like something like this?
About that size, but it's not

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too bad.
Yeah.

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About that size of a book.
So we're talking maybe 128 pages

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now he's.
You might have to.

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I mean read a couple, read, read
a paragraph a time or two.

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Yeah, yeah.
But if you can keep up with the

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day's discussion, you, you, you
should generally be OK.

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And what he is seeking is what
are those axioms that we can

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build up from?
Like that, the absolutes that

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you can take to the bank.
Right.

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And if you can get enough of
those, you'll get right.

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Yeah, something that's
indubitable.

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What a great word.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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Can't doubt it.
And so the goal isn't

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necessarily probability or
plausibility, but absolute

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certainty.
Same stuff to come by.

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Couldn't, couldn't not doubt
this.

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And he goes through all of you
know, all of the, I won't, you

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know, all the things that he
thinks that he could put in the

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place of this and he can find
some way that he can doubt it.

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Yeah, 'cause almost everything
in a way can fool you.

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I mean, or a lot of things can.
I've been fooled just by like,

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you think you see something but
you don't, or the glares like

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this.
Or have you been to like a

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Science Museum?
It's like, is this coil hot or

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cold?
If they're like back-to-back to

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back or it's like you can't
really tell.

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And then he's a little bit ahead
of his time.

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These thinkers, because they
actually propose something like

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the movie Matrix, like this
could all be an illusion.

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We could be nothing that we are
experiencing physically could

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actually be real.
Maybe there's this very powerful

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bad entity, we call it a demon,
who is really tricking all of

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us.
So that's what they're trying to

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get through.
Like so he adopts what he calls

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a methodological doubt.
He is going to doubt everything

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and not trust it if it can be
doubted, even if the doubt is

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only possible and the doubt is
epistemic, not practical or

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psychological.
So he suscends belief in sensory

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knowledge.
Like I don't trust anything that

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I can sense.
'Cause it could be an it could

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be dreaming for all you know.
Like this?

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Yep, he suspends belief in
mathematical truths.

227
00:11:49,920 --> 00:11:52,760
Like maybe there's an evil demon
who has tricked us into

228
00:11:52,760 --> 00:11:54,720
believing all the mathematical
things that we believe.

229
00:11:54,760 --> 00:11:57,760
They're saying 2 + 2 is 5, and
that's just what you, that's

230
00:11:57,760 --> 00:11:58,840
what you're building off of,
yeah.

231
00:12:00,320 --> 00:12:03,760
He he suspends belief in the
real physical world.

232
00:12:03,760 --> 00:12:05,400
Like maybe this rule doesn't
exist.

233
00:12:06,920 --> 00:12:11,360
If you listen to William, like
Craig make a reference to a

234
00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:16,200
Boseman brain, but basically
this brain that is in some type

235
00:12:16,200 --> 00:12:20,800
of metaphysical or some type of
VAT or something that thinks

236
00:12:20,800 --> 00:12:22,520
it's sensing stuff, but it's not
really.

237
00:12:23,640 --> 00:12:26,760
So, you know, there's other
people that he doubts the

238
00:12:26,760 --> 00:12:29,240
existence of his own body.
So he's just doubting

239
00:12:29,320 --> 00:12:32,400
everything.
And so he introduces these

240
00:12:32,400 --> 00:12:37,960
progressively stronger skeptical
scenarios, sensory deception.

241
00:12:38,040 --> 00:12:40,080
You know, sometimes our senses
deceive us.

242
00:12:40,400 --> 00:12:44,240
The dream argument or the matrix
argument, an evil demon.

243
00:12:44,640 --> 00:12:47,040
And the result is that
everything that depends on

244
00:12:47,040 --> 00:12:51,240
perception, inference, prior
assumptions is placed in doubt.

245
00:12:51,240 --> 00:12:53,880
That's a lot of things.
It's a lot of things and that's

246
00:12:53,880 --> 00:12:59,000
why I like it.
Atomist would be like this is

247
00:12:59,000 --> 00:13:01,320
not good.
Because you need, you have to be

248
00:13:01,320 --> 00:13:02,920
ground.
You can ground in certain

249
00:13:02,920 --> 00:13:04,280
things.
Yeah, if you can't trust your

250
00:13:04,280 --> 00:13:08,360
senses, then how he can trust
anything But and, and I think

251
00:13:08,360 --> 00:13:11,320
there's a case to be made here
that while we can trust our

252
00:13:11,320 --> 00:13:13,760
senses, what he's going to get
to you can trust even more than

253
00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:17,200
your senses.
It's got a higher certainty of,

254
00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:21,600
of trust and that and, and
generally, you know, probably

255
00:13:21,600 --> 00:13:26,680
not, you know, Doctor Thomas may
not say I'm a Thomas, but or

256
00:13:26,960 --> 00:13:30,400
Doctor Bridges may not say I'm a
Thomas, but I, I think I am.

257
00:13:30,840 --> 00:13:32,400
But I still find this to be
useful.

258
00:13:32,400 --> 00:13:33,720
OK.
Yeah, yeah.

259
00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:35,440
So that's.
The problem too, people get in

260
00:13:35,440 --> 00:13:37,040
there like lanes, you know what
I mean?

261
00:13:37,040 --> 00:13:39,200
You can't like just just take
the best, you know?

262
00:13:39,240 --> 00:13:41,360
Like all the Thomas say this is
bad.

263
00:13:41,360 --> 00:13:44,680
So as a Thomas, I'm going to
oscillate his bad like no I, I I

264
00:13:44,680 --> 00:13:47,440
find use in this, but
nevertheless.

265
00:13:48,440 --> 00:13:52,040
So while doubting everything,
Descartes notices something

266
00:13:52,240 --> 00:13:57,720
that's unavoidable.
Doubting is a type of thinking

267
00:13:57,720 --> 00:13:59,000
man.
Yeah.

268
00:13:59,000 --> 00:14:02,480
So even if you're doubting that
you're thinking of doubting.

269
00:14:02,640 --> 00:14:05,440
Right.
And so thinking requires A

270
00:14:05,440 --> 00:14:08,080
thinker.
And so this realization is like,

271
00:14:08,120 --> 00:14:12,080
even if there is a demon who's
deceiving him about everything

272
00:14:12,080 --> 00:14:16,400
else and he's doubting
everything else, the deception

273
00:14:16,400 --> 00:14:20,440
itself presupposes that there is
someone who there who's being

274
00:14:20,440 --> 00:14:21,920
deceived.
And this was the problem with

275
00:14:22,200 --> 00:14:25,920
Daniel Dennett's you know, the
consciousness is just an

276
00:14:25,920 --> 00:14:30,400
illusion bit because and for
there to be an illusion, there

277
00:14:30,400 --> 00:14:32,120
has to be someone who's being
deceived.

278
00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:36,600
So you can't deny the someone
somewhere because they're if our

279
00:14:36,600 --> 00:14:40,400
conscious, you know, you're
taking away the someone who's

280
00:14:40,400 --> 00:14:42,760
supposedly being deceived that
they exist.

281
00:14:43,240 --> 00:14:46,200
So, you know, this would cut
right through that type of

282
00:14:46,200 --> 00:14:48,480
thinking.
So therefore the very act of

283
00:14:48,480 --> 00:14:52,280
doubt confirms the existence of
the doubter.

284
00:14:52,440 --> 00:14:54,640
So it's kind of a.
Sure, I might be wrong if

285
00:14:54,640 --> 00:14:57,320
something's hot or cold, but I'm
feeling something or I'm

286
00:14:57,320 --> 00:14:59,480
thinking something like like
something's happening.

287
00:15:00,240 --> 00:15:01,560
I'm thinking something.
Right.

288
00:15:01,720 --> 00:15:03,520
Whether it's right?
Right, right.

289
00:15:03,960 --> 00:15:08,760
And so then you get this famous
formulation we hear in English.

290
00:15:08,760 --> 00:15:10,520
I think therefore I am, you
know, we all the time.

291
00:15:10,680 --> 00:15:12,120
We're going to.
Say that you just have.

292
00:15:12,120 --> 00:15:13,680
No idea.
No, Exactly.

293
00:15:13,720 --> 00:15:15,520
Yeah.
It's like, it's like you're in a

294
00:15:15,520 --> 00:15:16,960
class in high school.
That's like the matching

295
00:15:16,960 --> 00:15:18,040
question.
You're like, that's all.

296
00:15:18,040 --> 00:15:19,600
You don't need to go much deeper
than that.

297
00:15:19,600 --> 00:15:21,440
Yeah, yeah.
And then in the original what he

298
00:15:21,440 --> 00:15:26,000
wrote would be cogito ergo sum,
which I think ergo is with that

299
00:15:26,320 --> 00:15:28,720
gets translated right into
English.

300
00:15:29,360 --> 00:15:34,680
Cogito you can think of cognate
so I am thinking and sum just

301
00:15:34,680 --> 00:15:36,440
means to exist so.
It's.

302
00:15:36,800 --> 00:15:39,440
A fairly easy translation.
Cogito ergo sum.

303
00:15:39,480 --> 00:15:43,320
There you go, like it.
So important clarification.

304
00:15:43,520 --> 00:15:47,120
Descartes does not present this
as a syllogism.

305
00:15:47,880 --> 00:15:50,560
It's not, you know, all thinking
things exist.

306
00:15:50,560 --> 00:15:52,960
Minor premise.
I am thinking, therefore I exist

307
00:15:52,960 --> 00:15:55,320
instead.
This is like that axiom, like

308
00:15:55,320 --> 00:16:01,120
the axiomatic geometric premise.
It's an immediate intuitive

309
00:16:01,240 --> 00:16:04,720
knowledge.
The truth is grasped directly.

310
00:16:04,880 --> 00:16:08,840
It's self-evident.
It's known in the very act of

311
00:16:08,960 --> 00:16:13,080
thinking.
Can I just say I don't think I

312
00:16:13,080 --> 00:16:15,400
exist?
Yeah, yeah.

313
00:16:15,400 --> 00:16:16,800
So that would be self
contradictory.

314
00:16:16,880 --> 00:16:20,440
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah 'cause
you can't not exist.

315
00:16:21,560 --> 00:16:25,120
The Kajito cannot be doubted
without a contradiction to, you

316
00:16:25,120 --> 00:16:29,160
know, like what you're saying.
To doubt that I exist is itself

317
00:16:29,200 --> 00:16:32,000
an act of thinking.
The ACT confirms the truth

318
00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:36,520
that's being doubted, so even
deception cannot undermine it.

319
00:16:36,520 --> 00:16:39,680
If I'm deceived, great.
I must still exist to be

320
00:16:40,120 --> 00:16:42,800
deceived.
And so the certainty is not

321
00:16:42,800 --> 00:16:44,360
inferential.
I'm not inferring it based on

322
00:16:44,360 --> 00:16:46,960
anything else.
It's not a, you know, I don't

323
00:16:46,960 --> 00:16:50,440
need a more basic foundational
thing.

324
00:16:50,760 --> 00:16:53,840
It's not sensory because I'm not
feeling my way.

325
00:16:55,560 --> 00:16:58,680
It's not depending on memory.
Like you, you know, this is one

326
00:16:58,680 --> 00:17:01,560
of things, like, what if all
your memories you, there's no

327
00:17:01,560 --> 00:17:05,800
way that you could really know.
Yeah, that everything that's 5

328
00:17:05,800 --> 00:17:09,480
minutes old and older existed.
Right, right for.

329
00:17:09,480 --> 00:17:12,119
You could be being tricked into
believing all that history.

330
00:17:12,400 --> 00:17:15,280
Now I'm doubting everything.
But if you're doubting, you

331
00:17:15,280 --> 00:17:17,440
still expect.
That's like the going back to

332
00:17:17,440 --> 00:17:21,359
what he was aiming for,
foundational certainty, absolute

333
00:17:21,359 --> 00:17:23,599
that kind of like gets
underneath all these other

334
00:17:23,599 --> 00:17:24,520
things.
Right.

335
00:17:25,920 --> 00:17:28,800
And it's present wherever the
act of thinking occurs.

336
00:17:28,800 --> 00:17:31,720
So even if we don't know if it's
in this plane or another plane

337
00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:35,760
of existence, there's some
place, some way that this

338
00:17:35,760 --> 00:17:39,800
thinker is existing.
And so he exists there.

339
00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:43,800
What the ion cogito means At
this stage, Descartes does not

340
00:17:43,800 --> 00:17:47,920
even claim that he has a body,
that he has hands or eyes or a

341
00:17:47,920 --> 00:17:51,680
brain, that he's a human being.
It's just that there is a

342
00:17:51,720 --> 00:17:54,280
thinking thing just.
Basic I mean.

343
00:17:54,360 --> 00:17:55,520
Foundational.
I mean, yes.

344
00:17:56,280 --> 00:18:00,000
Res cogitans.
And that thinking includes

345
00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:02,120
doubting, understanding,
affirming, denying, willing,

346
00:18:02,120 --> 00:18:07,840
imagining and perceiving.
So hopefully, like to me talking

347
00:18:07,840 --> 00:18:10,920
about this, I get excited, get a
little chill bumps.

348
00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:12,840
It's like, wow.
You got chills too, not just me.

349
00:18:14,640 --> 00:18:17,800
Like, you know, like.
Now that makes sense.

350
00:18:17,800 --> 00:18:21,720
I think therefore I am
foundational because you can run

351
00:18:21,720 --> 00:18:24,600
into, you can.
I remember hearing that and you

352
00:18:24,600 --> 00:18:26,720
can mean something very
different.

353
00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:32,320
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
The Cogito's certainty is moment

354
00:18:32,320 --> 00:18:34,680
by moment.
I exist, is, is true as long as

355
00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:36,200
you know that you're thinking or
doubting.

356
00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:39,240
So when you're sleeping, maybe
you're dreaming.

357
00:18:39,480 --> 00:18:41,640
Yeah, I guess if you're dreaming
and you're thinking, then you

358
00:18:41,640 --> 00:18:44,760
could say you're existing.
Their strain is deliberate.

359
00:18:44,760 --> 00:18:47,400
He avoids smuggling and
assumptions about persistence or

360
00:18:47,400 --> 00:18:50,240
substance, those will be argued
later.

361
00:18:50,280 --> 00:18:52,640
So we're going to, So all we're
really, we're just trying to get

362
00:18:52,640 --> 00:18:56,560
that very basic geometric axiom
here.

363
00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:01,680
The cogito is clear, it's
present, accessible to an

364
00:19:01,680 --> 00:19:04,480
intentive mind.
It's distinct, it's separable

365
00:19:04,480 --> 00:19:07,600
from other ideas.
So this becomes a criterion of

366
00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:09,920
truth.
Whatever is perceived clearly

367
00:19:10,120 --> 00:19:14,120
and distinctly is true.
The cogito is a paradigm,

368
00:19:15,120 --> 00:19:18,880
paradigm case of being able to
be clearly and distinctly

369
00:19:20,200 --> 00:19:21,840
perceived as true.
Now there have been philosophers

370
00:19:21,840 --> 00:19:28,120
that come after and have tried
to pick on this definition of

371
00:19:28,120 --> 00:19:29,120
truth.
So if you read through

372
00:19:29,120 --> 00:19:32,000
meditations, you'll hear this
definition like the test is

373
00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:36,560
clearly and distinctly true.
And so some people have said,

374
00:19:36,560 --> 00:19:41,280
well, we don't think we agree
with, you know, the cart when he

375
00:19:41,280 --> 00:19:44,200
said this wasn't clear or that
this is clear, those types of

376
00:19:44,200 --> 00:19:45,680
things.
So that is a definition that

377
00:19:45,680 --> 00:19:48,040
you're going to have to decide
for yourself whether you think

378
00:19:48,800 --> 00:19:54,080
the cart has handled it well.
However, the reliability of the

379
00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:56,000
criterion still requires
justification.

380
00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:58,960
Justification comes later in the
proof of God's existence.

381
00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:02,840
So we are leading up to a proof.
That.

382
00:20:03,280 --> 00:20:07,520
God exists based on the fact
that I think, therefore I am.

383
00:20:07,840 --> 00:20:09,840
It's great 'cause I, I think I
mentioned this in the last

384
00:20:09,840 --> 00:20:13,480
episode of this that I, I've
seen, I've read stuff going both

385
00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:17,240
ways where people are like the
carts the worst because it was

386
00:20:17,240 --> 00:20:21,200
like the beginning of
introducing not God things, but

387
00:20:21,200 --> 00:20:24,600
he's coming from a God
perspective, you know, 'cause

388
00:20:24,880 --> 00:20:27,320
you know, it's saying, oh, why,
why don't we just, I think

389
00:20:27,680 --> 00:20:29,360
what's the people looking at?
Like, why don't we just start

390
00:20:29,360 --> 00:20:30,560
with scripture?
Like, you know what I mean?

391
00:20:30,560 --> 00:20:32,280
Like, you know what I'm saying?
It's like, that's like the

392
00:20:32,720 --> 00:20:35,480
mindset behind it versus the
philosophy.

393
00:20:35,680 --> 00:20:39,480
But these same people also can
be critical of Thomas, like,

394
00:20:39,480 --> 00:20:41,080
like, you know what I'm saying?
They're like, why are we doing

395
00:20:41,080 --> 00:20:42,880
that?
Like, why are we metaphysics,

396
00:20:42,880 --> 00:20:44,400
like philosophy, like what are
we doing?

397
00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:45,160
You know what I mean?
We have.

398
00:20:45,160 --> 00:20:46,600
God's word.
Why are we judging God?

399
00:20:47,240 --> 00:20:49,280
We were you.
Oh man, to put God in the

400
00:20:49,280 --> 00:20:50,600
judgement box, right?
That kind.

401
00:20:50,600 --> 00:20:52,040
Of thing.
So that's kind of something we

402
00:20:52,040 --> 00:20:55,440
talked about earlier, like why
can't you just like these things

403
00:20:55,440 --> 00:20:57,920
are true about philosophy,
metaphysics, like we can say

404
00:20:57,920 --> 00:20:59,480
these are good.
Like you don't, you know what I

405
00:20:59,480 --> 00:20:59,840
mean?
Like.

406
00:20:59,840 --> 00:21:02,960
Yeah, right.
And, and the part of the problem

407
00:21:02,960 --> 00:21:07,600
here was these are people who
are are going to push and

408
00:21:08,160 --> 00:21:10,160
they're going to push the
pendulum a little bit too far.

409
00:21:10,640 --> 00:21:13,880
But for hundreds of years, you
believe things based on

410
00:21:13,880 --> 00:21:16,480
authority.
This person in authority said

411
00:21:16,480 --> 00:21:18,160
it.
There's no reason to question

412
00:21:18,160 --> 00:21:18,960
it.
You believe it.

413
00:21:19,440 --> 00:21:22,080
And so there's a time where
like, we don't want to believe

414
00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:26,000
that anymore.
Like I want to verify this some

415
00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:27,680
way.
So that's part of this

416
00:21:27,680 --> 00:21:30,120
Enlightenment theory, part of
like the critical way of

417
00:21:30,120 --> 00:21:33,960
interpreting the Bible.
We're not going to believe all

418
00:21:33,960 --> 00:21:39,120
of these people who told us that
Matthew was first and then, you

419
00:21:39,120 --> 00:21:42,040
know, Peter copied Matthew and
Luke to get Mark.

420
00:21:42,160 --> 00:21:45,000
There you.
Are you know that it all comes

421
00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:49,120
out of this push against we want
to the evidence to speak for

422
00:21:49,120 --> 00:21:51,480
itself.
And so this is this is part of

423
00:21:51,480 --> 00:21:53,920
that.
Now just as we're kind of taking

424
00:21:53,920 --> 00:21:57,400
aside from the notes.
I think it's curious that we've

425
00:21:57,400 --> 00:22:02,080
had two congregational meetings,
2 testimonies.

426
00:22:02,840 --> 00:22:04,680
Apologetics.
And both of them said

427
00:22:04,680 --> 00:22:07,280
apologetics led me to Christ.
That's pretty crazy, yeah.

428
00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:09,880
Yeah.
I'm like, yeah, yeah, yeah,

429
00:22:09,920 --> 00:22:10,600
yeah.
That's great.

430
00:22:10,600 --> 00:22:13,360
And I come from such a different
place where I, I've always had

431
00:22:13,360 --> 00:22:17,440
an interest in apologetics, but
I was never like, I'm always

432
00:22:17,440 --> 00:22:19,440
like rooting for the home team,
so to speak.

433
00:22:19,720 --> 00:22:24,680
Like I've never, I've never been
like, I don't think, like I have

434
00:22:24,680 --> 00:22:27,000
more reason to think God is not
real than real.

435
00:22:27,080 --> 00:22:29,760
You know what I mean?
It's so fascinating to hear like

436
00:22:29,920 --> 00:22:31,880
people and it's like these
arguments and they were

437
00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:33,360
listening and I won them over.
You know what I mean?

438
00:22:33,360 --> 00:22:35,320
So that's pretty cool.
Yeah.

439
00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:40,560
I, I, I did, you did.
I guess he was saying more cult

440
00:22:40,560 --> 00:22:41,880
like apologize.
Did you?

441
00:22:41,880 --> 00:22:43,560
I don't know if you followed up
with like, which podcast do you

442
00:22:43,560 --> 00:22:44,880
listen to?
I I should I meant to?

443
00:22:44,880 --> 00:22:48,000
Ask that I'm guessing Well, when
he said cult, I'm thinking Jeff

444
00:22:48,000 --> 00:22:51,680
Durbin, I'm thinking James
White, 'cause they deal with

445
00:22:51,960 --> 00:22:53,200
those.
So maybe who?

446
00:22:54,040 --> 00:22:57,200
And so maybe he's a
presuppositional, you know,

447
00:22:57,200 --> 00:22:59,440
apologist, you know, 'cause
that's what they're they're

448
00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:01,320
gonna be.
But don't you know by what

449
00:23:01,320 --> 00:23:02,920
standard?
Don't put God in the judgement

450
00:23:02,920 --> 00:23:05,280
box.
Who are you, old man, to judge?

451
00:23:05,280 --> 00:23:07,120
But, you know, the Bible tells
us to judge.

452
00:23:07,360 --> 00:23:09,640
So I'm just, I'm just being
obedient to what God said.

453
00:23:09,720 --> 00:23:11,920
Man, you're like.
Hey, if you don't, if you don't

454
00:23:11,920 --> 00:23:14,480
believe me for this, believe me
for the miracles that I'm doing.

455
00:23:15,120 --> 00:23:17,120
And then who was who?
Did Jacob say he wasn't too a

456
00:23:17,120 --> 00:23:18,120
lot?
What was that one guy saying?

457
00:23:18,600 --> 00:23:20,880
I think.
I can't remember.

458
00:23:21,600 --> 00:23:24,400
Did you say William on Craig?
He mentioned Wayne, one Clay.

459
00:23:24,480 --> 00:23:27,680
He mentioned another guy too,
not the side Rd. but I was like,

460
00:23:27,680 --> 00:23:29,720
oh, that's so interesting.
Yeah, that both of them did

461
00:23:29,720 --> 00:23:31,760
mention like listening to hours
and hours and hours of

462
00:23:31,760 --> 00:23:32,600
apologetics.
That's cool.

463
00:23:32,600 --> 00:23:35,120
Yeah.
So coming back to our notes,

464
00:23:35,120 --> 00:23:38,160
what the Kajito does not
establish, it doesn't establish

465
00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:40,000
the existence of the external
world.

466
00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:42,240
So just because he's a thinker
doesn't mean there's an external

467
00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:44,280
world.
It doesn't establish his other

468
00:23:44,280 --> 00:23:46,360
minds, the reliability
assistance.

469
00:23:46,360 --> 00:23:49,360
It doesn't even establish the
existence of God yet.

470
00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:50,960
Yeah, build on that to get
there.

471
00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:53,760
It doesn't establish the body
mind relationship.

472
00:23:53,760 --> 00:23:56,360
It only establishes the fact
that there is something that is

473
00:23:56,360 --> 00:23:58,920
thinking, Something that is
thinking, yeah.

474
00:23:58,920 --> 00:24:01,200
It's it's, it's a foundational
basic thought.

475
00:24:01,560 --> 00:24:04,560
And that's like at least right
now it's, that's all it's doing.

476
00:24:04,560 --> 00:24:06,280
It is very foundational.
It's underneath everything, but

477
00:24:06,280 --> 00:24:07,960
that's like all it's doing.
Too.

478
00:24:07,960 --> 00:24:09,760
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
That's, that's its only role

479
00:24:09,760 --> 00:24:14,600
right now.
So Cochito shifts philosophy

480
00:24:14,600 --> 00:24:19,720
from metaphysics of being to
epistemology of certainty, the

481
00:24:19,720 --> 00:24:23,960
external realism to subjective
centered foundation.

482
00:24:23,960 --> 00:24:27,800
So, and this is part of the
problem that Thomas had with it

483
00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:31,600
is like once you doubt all that
other stuff, you cannot.

484
00:24:31,920 --> 00:24:36,760
You've given it all away.
There's no way to get back to it

485
00:24:37,680 --> 00:24:40,160
using the same logical
principles that you did.

486
00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:45,040
All you know is that you exist
and you have no real reason to

487
00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:46,560
think that even other people
exist.

488
00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:49,360
So that you, you'd say you'd
never get out of solipsism.

489
00:24:49,360 --> 00:24:53,280
Solipsism is the idea that you
are a mind that exists and no

490
00:24:53,280 --> 00:24:55,640
other minds exist.
And everything else you see is

491
00:24:55,640 --> 00:24:58,760
just like your own dream or
some, you know, you're going to

492
00:24:58,760 --> 00:25:02,960
make me up type of thing.
But I, I don't think it is quite

493
00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:08,600
as bad as that.
So it inaugurates some modern

494
00:25:08,600 --> 00:25:10,720
philosophy.
It inaugurates the real

495
00:25:10,720 --> 00:25:15,320
rationalism, the primacy of
consciousness in epistemology.

496
00:25:16,040 --> 00:25:20,280
There are later responses lot
questions the nature of of self

497
00:25:20,320 --> 00:25:23,160
humanize A substantial self
behind perceptions.

498
00:25:23,160 --> 00:25:27,000
Can't will refame that I think
as a transcendental condition,

499
00:25:27,000 --> 00:25:29,640
not as a substance.
So there are responses to this.

500
00:25:29,640 --> 00:25:31,200
So it's not like anything
philosophy.

501
00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:32,200
Is not what I've done.
That's right.

502
00:25:32,320 --> 00:25:32,880
That's right.
Yeah.

503
00:25:33,560 --> 00:25:38,120
All right, so how do we get from
a thinking thing to God?

504
00:25:39,080 --> 00:25:41,120
So that's what we're going to
lead up to and we're going to

505
00:25:41,120 --> 00:25:44,120
end with this.
And then Part 3, we'll look at

506
00:25:44,120 --> 00:25:49,760
some of the critical responses
to the cogito air lasum, and

507
00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:52,920
then how how you might defend it
against some of those.

508
00:25:53,240 --> 00:25:56,640
So if a thinking thing exists,
this is secured by the cogito.

509
00:25:56,640 --> 00:25:58,720
There's doubting, there's
affirming, there's reasoning,

510
00:25:59,600 --> 00:26:04,040
presupposition by the thinker.
The premise is epistemically

511
00:26:04,120 --> 00:26:07,320
minimal and does not assume
bodies, sense perceptions, or

512
00:26:07,320 --> 00:26:09,160
the external world.
Some of this is, you know,

513
00:26:09,160 --> 00:26:13,480
repetitive because it's
self-contained, exhaustive

514
00:26:13,480 --> 00:26:16,440
ontological division.
Anything that exists must either

515
00:26:17,080 --> 00:26:22,120
exist contingently or it must
exist necessarily.

516
00:26:22,120 --> 00:26:24,200
Those are the like you're
saying, only two categories.

517
00:26:24,200 --> 00:26:25,560
You got to fall into one of
these buckets.

518
00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:32,160
Right by the the you know and
Descartes doesn't, he assumes

519
00:26:32,160 --> 00:26:36,160
the laws of logic.
I think there are other axioms

520
00:26:36,160 --> 00:26:39,320
that you could bring into this.
So you could have the cogito

521
00:26:39,320 --> 00:26:43,520
ergo sum as one of your axioms.
And the laws of logic, the laws

522
00:26:43,520 --> 00:26:49,400
of logic are X is XX is not not
X.

523
00:26:49,920 --> 00:26:56,360
And there's the law of excluded
middle so that there's only X

524
00:26:56,360 --> 00:27:00,720
and not X for well defined X.
Those are the laws of logic.

525
00:27:01,360 --> 00:27:03,520
Just three laws.
Of logic, there's the identity,

526
00:27:03,520 --> 00:27:06,600
there's the non contradiction
and the law of excluded middle.

527
00:27:06,920 --> 00:27:10,000
So by the law of excluded
middle, this thinking thing,

528
00:27:10,080 --> 00:27:14,520
this race cogence, it's either
has to be necessary or not

529
00:27:14,520 --> 00:27:17,320
necessary.
The the word we like to use for

530
00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:24,120
not necessary is contingent.
And so you could imagine that,

531
00:27:25,200 --> 00:27:27,480
well, what what's the most
likely scenario?

532
00:27:27,480 --> 00:27:34,000
Is the cart a necessary thinker
or is he a contingent thinker?

533
00:27:35,400 --> 00:27:38,720
So, you know, you assume the
thinking thing exists

534
00:27:38,720 --> 00:27:43,760
contingently by the principle of
sufficient reason, or at least a

535
00:27:43,760 --> 00:27:46,640
casual version of it.
Whatever exists, contingents

536
00:27:46,840 --> 00:27:50,240
contingently has to have a cause
of its existence, right?

537
00:27:50,680 --> 00:27:53,840
So if you have, you know,
there's a phone, it can, it

538
00:27:53,840 --> 00:27:55,880
exists contingently,
contingently.

539
00:27:55,880 --> 00:27:59,760
It could have not existed.
There has to be a cause for how

540
00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:02,440
it came into existence.
Well, the same thing.

541
00:28:02,600 --> 00:28:07,400
We can say Descartes is a res
cogitans.

542
00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:10,840
He's a thinking thing, but he's
contingent.

543
00:28:10,840 --> 00:28:13,920
So there has to be a cause for
him to be thinking.

544
00:28:14,600 --> 00:28:19,200
Therefore, the thinking thing
has a cause of its existence #4

545
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:23,520
the cause of the the.
The thing must either itself

546
00:28:23,520 --> 00:28:28,720
exist contingently or exist
necessarily, And if it is

547
00:28:28,720 --> 00:28:30,840
contingent, it likewise needs a
cause.

548
00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:33,880
And so then this generates this
chain of.

549
00:28:34,520 --> 00:28:37,240
This thinking thing has a thing.
It just goes on and on and on.

550
00:28:37,280 --> 00:28:39,280
You got it, you know, forever.
Right.

551
00:28:39,280 --> 00:28:41,440
And so we reject the infinite
regress.

552
00:28:41,920 --> 00:28:45,360
And so that means that somewhere
at the end of this change, the

553
00:28:45,480 --> 00:28:49,720
chain, the series must terminate
in a 'cause that is not

554
00:28:49,720 --> 00:28:51,720
contingent.
And the other way we say

555
00:28:51,720 --> 00:28:53,080
something that is not
contingent.

556
00:28:53,120 --> 00:28:57,120
We say that it is necessary.
And so if we have a necessary

557
00:28:57,120 --> 00:29:02,720
being, it exists by the
necessity of its own nature.

558
00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:05,720
It does not derive its existence
from another.

559
00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:09,760
It is the ultimate explanatory
ground of contingent beings.

560
00:29:10,640 --> 00:29:12,680
You could even make an argument
that you can't have two

561
00:29:12,680 --> 00:29:17,960
necessary beings because because
their their characteristics

562
00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:20,920
overlap.
So you can't distinguish 2

563
00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:23,440
necessary beings if you truly
understand what it means to be

564
00:29:23,440 --> 00:29:26,960
necessary because then they have
all the same I'll say the word

565
00:29:26,960 --> 00:29:28,640
properties.
Thomas don't like the same the

566
00:29:28,640 --> 00:29:31,400
word property, but they have all
the same characteristics.

567
00:29:32,280 --> 00:29:35,920
The things I can say true of
this necessary thing and the

568
00:29:35,920 --> 00:29:38,320
thing I can say true, this
necessary thing are all the

569
00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:42,000
exact same.
So you can't, you can't they're,

570
00:29:42,400 --> 00:29:46,560
they're identical.
And so this necessary being

571
00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:50,400
causes or grounds the existence
of the contingent beings,

572
00:29:50,400 --> 00:29:52,840
including the thinking thing
which we begin with.

573
00:29:53,480 --> 00:30:00,680
So therefore we arrive at that
necessary being as God.

574
00:30:00,760 --> 00:30:05,080
A being that exists necessarily
is uncaused, is the ultimate

575
00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:08,640
ground of contingent existence.
This fits the classical

576
00:30:08,640 --> 00:30:12,200
definition of God.
Therefore God exists.

577
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:16,080
So there are some assumptions
with this argument.

578
00:30:16,080 --> 00:30:18,480
It assumes a real distinction
between contingent and necessary

579
00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:21,800
existence.
It assumes this causal principle

580
00:30:21,920 --> 00:30:26,920
that something, if it exists
contingently, it has to have a

581
00:30:27,440 --> 00:30:31,000
reason for a subsistence.
It assumes the possibility of an

582
00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:34,080
infinite regress, the
impossibility of an infinite

583
00:30:34,080 --> 00:30:36,080
regress of purely contingent
causes.

584
00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:39,760
So we could use some other
arguments to show why you can't

585
00:30:39,760 --> 00:30:42,120
have an infinite regress, but
this we're just assuming that

586
00:30:42,120 --> 00:30:45,160
right now.
It does not assume sensory

587
00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:47,520
realism.
It does not assume empirical

588
00:30:47,520 --> 00:30:50,120
cosmology.
It does not assume Aristotelian

589
00:30:50,120 --> 00:30:53,000
forms.
It does not assume Platonic

590
00:30:53,000 --> 00:30:56,760
forms.
It does not assume a thick

591
00:30:56,800 --> 00:31:00,920
account of natural causation.
So really it's very which very

592
00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:04,440
stripped down.
A thinking thing exists

593
00:31:04,440 --> 00:31:07,320
contingently.
There has to be a cause for it

594
00:31:07,320 --> 00:31:10,320
to exist.
That can't be an infinite

595
00:31:10,320 --> 00:31:14,800
regress of contingent things has
to stop with a necessary thing.

596
00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:18,480
When we think what it means to
be a necessary thing, that thing

597
00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:21,680
looks and smells and acts like
what we call God.

598
00:31:21,680 --> 00:31:23,240
OK, Yeah.
Therefore God exists.

599
00:31:23,400 --> 00:31:24,120
Boom.
Yeah.

600
00:31:24,120 --> 00:31:25,360
I.
Love it.

601
00:31:26,240 --> 00:31:27,240
I know you just said a minute
ago.

602
00:31:27,240 --> 00:31:29,120
So what are we teeing up for
next?

603
00:31:29,160 --> 00:31:31,800
Next time.
So next time on this, so we're

604
00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:35,600
going to look at some of the
criticism.

605
00:31:35,680 --> 00:31:37,800
Of the.
Argument and then try to maybe

606
00:31:37,800 --> 00:31:41,280
answer some of those.
And like you know, is with any

607
00:31:41,280 --> 00:31:43,680
argument, there's strengths and
weaknesses and things that you

608
00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:47,600
assume and, and so we'll look at
that and, and can we get back to

609
00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:50,640
a real world from this?
Yeah, 'cause this is

610
00:31:50,640 --> 00:31:56,920
foundational, but you're still
kind of, what's that even mean?

611
00:31:56,920 --> 00:31:57,200
Yeah.
Yeah.

612
00:31:57,200 --> 00:31:57,920
Well, you know.
Yeah.

613
00:31:57,960 --> 00:31:58,720
Yeah.
OK, that's good.

614
00:31:58,840 --> 00:32:00,840
Awesome.
There we go.

615
00:32:00,840 --> 00:32:03,000
There we go.
Cart 101 Cogito.

616
00:32:03,200 --> 00:32:05,000
Yeah, hopefully you didn't get
lost in that.

617
00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:08,040
It makes sense all along.
The way I think it did, I think

618
00:32:09,360 --> 00:32:13,440
the first half made total sense
and then I think we went quickly

619
00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:15,640
at the end with some, but I
think it all makes sense.

620
00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:19,280
Like I think, you know, it all
all checks out.

621
00:32:19,280 --> 00:32:21,600
Like, I'd be curious, maybe we
can maybe some of this will be

622
00:32:21,600 --> 00:32:25,880
brought up in the criticisms
like, you know, I would like to

623
00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:27,600
know more about contingent
necessary.

624
00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:30,920
Are these like us?
You know, what are your other OP

625
00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:32,520
anyway?
But I think, but I think they

626
00:32:32,520 --> 00:32:33,360
all make sense.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

627
00:32:33,880 --> 00:32:34,400
Yeah.
Sounds good.

628
00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:35,680
Yeah, Yeah, forward that
through.

629
00:32:35,840 --> 00:32:39,880
All right, that's our take.
Thanks for listening to Take

630
00:32:39,880 --> 00:32:42,080
Two.
Find us wherever you find

631
00:32:42,080 --> 00:32:44,600
podcasts and on YouTube for
those who want to watch our

632
00:32:44,600 --> 00:32:45,280
video cast.